We analyze the performance of the Maastricht convergence criteria (inflation, long-term interest rate, annual and overall public debt) of the European Monetary Union (EMU) that led to the introduction of the Euro on Jan. 1 st 1999 as book currency. , 1992-97, 1997-1999 and 2000-2001, we analyse convergence properties, like a smooth or a rough transition in the mean or variance shifts between these 3 regimes. Given the regimes, we test the convergence in econometric models to see if the first and second moments of the convergence process are time dependent. Furthermore we check for a smooth transition process between the regimes and if the convergence process has stabilized around a target path.
The EMU presently consists of 12 member states, including Greece, which joined the Eurozone in 2001, two years after the start of the new currency in 1999. The performance of the EMU countries according to the Maastricht criteria during the years before and after the formal launch of the Euro on Jan. 1 st 1999 is an important threshold for a common European economic policy. With the planned enlargement of the EU, new candidates for Euro-Land will have to follow the Maastricht criteria as well.
Clearly, the compliance of these prescriptions of the Pact on Stability and Growth (PSG:
due to 1997) and the various discussions of these criteria are a highly political issue and are important for the future stability of the euro. Therefore the analysis of the economic convergence process is an important issue that will serve as a benchmark for future discussion of the performance of countries in Euro-Land. We will adopt an econometric view of the economic convergence process and we will analyse the joint time series behaviour of the 4 crucial economic indicators (inflation, public deficits, interest rates and public debt) over the time period 1992-2001.
We will consider two models for the modelling of the convergence behaviour over the Simple mean (or variance) divergence: The cross-sectional means (or variances) of the time series are increasing.
Modelling goals and caveats
Clearly, our approach is merely an ex-post statistical measurement of the observed movement in the underlying time series for the Maastricht Criteria of the EU countries.
Since no behavioral assumptions are present in our econometric models, we concentrate on and describe the phenomenon of convergence in a statistical sense. A driving role for the convergence process is played by expectations and policy credibility, which are rather complicated to impose in a descriptive approach and therefore are not considered explicitly in this paper.
Economically, we expect from the results that modelling the convergence process of inflation and long-term interest rates on the one side and annual deficits on the other side can be quite different. While the criteria for inflation and long-term interest rates were considered to be a strict entrance benchmark for the EMU, the criterion for government finances was less restrictive. Governments who had the intention to meet the government finance criteria were considered to be eligible for Euroland, too.
We expect that inflation and interest rates, two of the convergence criteria, will have similar convergence behavior because of their close economic interrelationship. Indeed, for several models inflation depends on the exogenously given level of nominal interest rates (e.g. see Dornbusch 1976) . On the other hand Central Banks, especially the ECB (see Treaty on EU (1999) , articles 105-124), set the level of nominal interest rates according to inflationary pressure. Moreover, debt ratios and annual deficits also are interrelated. On the other hand, convergence performance of these two groups of criteria is not necessarily related to each other, especially not in the beginning of the convergence procedure, i.e. in our notation for the Maastricht regime. The reason for this is that fiscal convergence is driven by business cycles and fiscal discipline.
Fiscal discipline, though, has certainly improved in the Eurozone by the PSG.
Unfortunately, the problem of business cycles affecting government budgets was not taken into account by the PSG, since it focuses on annual deficits instead of business cycle independent structural deficits. This shows certain weaknesses of the two fiscal Maastricht criteria and the PSG. Thus there is possibly room for improving rules of the PSG in the future.
Furthermore, we argue that the PSG is not necessarily satisfactory, neither for guaranteeing stabilization of achieved convergence of interest rates and inflation nor for implementing a consistent long-term trend towards perfect convergence of the Maastricht criteria nor for necessarily achieving economic convergence. The reason is that the PSG may create incentives for fiscal discipline and thus for fiscal convergence, but it does not necessarily imply economic convergence (e.g. in the sense of similar income levels or growth rates) nor convergence in the sense of converging interest rates and inflation.
Still concerning the PSG, we conclude that there is a principal-agency problem. Indeed, member countries have fewer incentives for further improving or at least stabilizing convergence, once they joined the Euro. Thus there is some evidence for divergence in the Euroland regime concerning several criteria. This is consistent with the hypothesis that the concept of convergence is highly time dependent. In fact we conclude that different time periods may show totally different convergence performance.
Greece is treated as a special case in this paper because of its different economic stage compared to other EMU members. Analysis without Greece deals with the fact of its being an outlier, but at the same time it allows classifying the convergence performance of Greece when comparing to results including Greece. In this sense Greece is somewhat like a pioneer for the coming eastern enlargement. Once the "eastern enlargement" of the EU has taken place, discussion about the adoption of the Euro in those new member countries will arise.
Furthermore we are interested in the question if the convergence process in the first moments (i.e. the mean equation of the spline model) was accompanied by a convergence process in the 2 nd moments. This means that we fit a heteroskedastic 2-or 3-regime convergence model for the conditional variances of the piecewise regression models.
Thus, it is not surprising that after the introduction of the Euro not all the countries fulfill the restriction of the maximum 60% debt to GDP ratio: 5 and 6 countries are not able do so in 2000 and 2001 respectively. We will see that the convergence for inflation and interest rates, -these are the two criteria depending on efficient financial and goods and services markets -already took place in the first regime before 1997. This is a clear indication that real economic convergence can be achieved more quickly than fiscal discipline for the public sector.
We also want to emphasize that the proposed convergence model is motivated by the econometric technique of spline models and has nothing to do with the approaches to economic convergence as in Barro et al. (1995) or Ben-David (1993) . Different ideas regarding economic convergence by index construction can be found in Franses (2000, 2001) .
The plan of the paper is as follows: We start in section 1 with an introduction to the modelling process; the data base and the Maastricht criteria are described in section 2.
In section 3 we briefly outline our econometric convergence approach while in section 4
we report the results. Section 5 reports the results of the heteroskedastic convergence models. The last section concludes. The appendix summarizes the heteroskedastic convergence models.
The EMU and the Maastricht criteria
First, let us consider a short historical overview of the EMU. The Maastricht treaty laid out three stages to arrange the EMU:
Stage 1, July 1990 -Dec 1993:
• Free movement of capital,
• Narrowing of ERM band,
• Closer co-operation between central banks,
• Closer co-ordination of economic policies.
Stage 2, Jan. 1994 -Dec 1998:
• Convergence of member states' economic and monetary policies,
• Establishment of European Central Bank,
• Independence of national banks,
• Participating countries fix their exchange rates.
Stage 3, Jan. 1999: Introduction of the Euro as a book currency, Jan. 2002: Launch of euro notes and coins.
In 1998, 11 of the 15 EU member states decided to form the European monetary union (EMU), leaving Denmark, Greece, Sweden and the UK outside the "eurozone".
In January 1999, financial markets of the EMU countries began operating in euros. Two years later, Greece finally met the economic requirements for membership and at the Lisbon meeting in June 2000 Greece was allowed to join the euro in January 2001.
The Maastricht criteria
We consider the twelve countries belonging to the European Monetary Union (EMU): This criterion is not relevant for this study, as we only look at the performance of countries already being members with a common currency.
LONG-TERM INTEREST RATES

"The durability of convergence achieved by the Member State [...] being reflected in the long-term interest-rate levels".
In practice, the nominal long-term interest rate must not exceed that of the three bestperforming Member States in terms of price stability by more than 2 percentage points.
Note that this refers to the same Member States as in the case of the price stability criterion. The crucial period is the year preceding the examination of the Member State for joining the euro.
Therefore we will focus our analysis on the inflation rates, the nominal long-term interest rates, annual government deficits and total public debt of each member, while simply ignoring the criterion regarding exchange rates, as it is obsolete now.
The modelling strategy
The empirical strategy employed in the paper implicitly assumes that there is a common (across member states) 'generating mechanism'. The implicit assumption is a common cross-sectional time trend according to Quah (1993) . According to this view, our modeling proposal considers the fact that the time series do not follow a uniform linear trend but perhaps a broken, segmented, possibly piecewise connected ("smooth") trend.
For each Maastricht criterion we will estimate a convergence model across the 12 EMU members and results of the convergence performance will be obtained independently for the four variables. We will treat the convergence modelling as a model selection problem: We look for the best performing parsimonious convergence model. Thus, this approach requires many estimates because different piecewise linear regression models have to be compared to each other. Furthermore, we have to cope with outliers?
exceptions, since Greece in particular is a special case for the convergence models.
Greek time series can be considered to document a previous unseen catching-up process and therefore it is not surprising that Greek time series are "outliers" in the sense of showing more extreme values in the first years of the convergence process if compared to other countries.
Unfortunately, from an econometric point of view, the Greek time series create a technical difficulty in the assumption that the convergence process in the Maastricht regime stems from a data generating process of the EU countries which is "uniform".
That means they agree at the same time to similar economic policy measures, they have the same time horizon to meet their goals, and they have roughly comparable starting conditions. Therefore the fact that Greece entered the EMU in 2001, after the introduction of the Euro by the other countries, distorts the estimation of the convergence process (due to a single country) and has an "outlier bias" effect on the least squares estimates.
To find out how big this effect of distortion can be on the estimates, we will analyze the convergence in our models without Greece (and occasionally without other "outlying" countries) to see its influence on the overall convergence behaviour. Furthermore we will check the analysis of overall public debt for outlying countries. As Luxembourg, Belgium, Italy and Greece all show extreme debt values compared to the other 8 countries (i.e. Luxembourg has a very low one, the other three a very high one), we will estimate the regression model for the group of 8 middle or "core" countries.
The data base
Data for EMU members are taken from Eurostat on a monthly or a yearly basis. The inflation rate is calculated from the price index (source: Datastream, IMF) from Sept.
to Sept. 2001. For the interest rates we had to start the convergence analysis in
April 1994 since the data were not available or comparable before 1994. The long-term interest rate for each country is the "Benchmark Bond 10 yr (DS)".
The monthly time series on the interest rate and the inflation were available up to September 2001. Finally the annual time series on annual deficit to GDP and overall public debt to GDP are based on OECD forecasts for the year 2001, since they are the only annual data sets that are available.
After calculating the mean of the three best performing countries for inflation rates each month, we subtract it from all national inflation rates for comparative purposes. The same procedure is applied to interest rates. Data for annual and overall public debt are all in absolute percentage terms to GDP. They are due to an OECD database for forecasts, annual reports of the European Central Bank for 1998 to 2000 and Eurostat, covering the years from 1990 to 1997. These data sets for the four criteria are sufficient for our research objective.
The methodology
To find out whether the convergence process of the Maastricht treaty has not eroded but continued in the two years since the introduction of the Euro, we suggest to model the convergence path for the EMU member states over the last decade by a piecewise regression model. By looking at the graphs of the individual time series for the convergence models, it is quite evident that there was an important change in the convergence process at the end of 1997. Indeed, there was a European Council meeting in Amsterdam on June 17 th 1997, which agreed on the so-called Pact of Stability and
Growth (PSG). This political decision made clear that the admittance of countries into
Euroland would be based on hard economic facts. The pact enforces also the fulfilment of EMU criteria over the next years. Maybe it was not as important as the Maastricht Treaty (1992) was, but it provided market participants with really strong expectations for convergence to take place. We will show, though, that the convergence for inflation and interest rates of EMU members, which are the two criteria depending on efficient financial and goods & services markets, already approached a similar level in member countries before. This may partly be due to real economic convergence already starting before and partly due to expectations of market participants already anticipating real events.
Our convergence modelling is based on a separate and a continuous piecewise linear regression model for a pooled cross-section and time series data set. We first introduce the so-called continuous piecewise regression or spline model (see e.g. Pindyck and
Rubinfeld, 1998) using dummy variables for the known break point x* which is assumed at the end of 1997. One break point x a * is only needed to estimate the two-regime model while two break points x a * is x c * are needed to estimate the 3-regime spline model. The first break point is assumed to be December 1997 as 1997 was the crucial year for the final decision on the countries that were allowed to adopt the Euro. This decision on the EMU was to be made in the middle of 1998 after the 1997 data for the convergence criteria being available. The second break point x c * marks the starting point of the Euro as a book currency, and we choose for data compatibility reasons December 1999. We will call the first regime the "Maastricht regime" and the second regime until the end of 1999 when the Euro was created as the "Amsterdam regime". The third regime is the "Euroland regime".
Testing in the convergence models
We will test the following 4 hypotheses for the piecewise regression models (continuous or separate): This implies a simple t-test for the slope coefficient in the 2 nd regime:
Hypothesis 3: The EMU countries have not diverged in the Euroland regime.
Again, this implies a one-sided t-test for the slope coefficient in the 3rd regime: We shall denote a convergence process in a certain regime a "targeted convergence" if the TIME coefficients in both, the mean and the variance equation, are significantly different from zero and negative. If the regime dependent TIME coefficients are positive then the process is called in this regime divergent. If the TIME coefficients are not significantly different from zero then there is no convergence (or divergence) for the given partition of the process into regimes.
In the next section we report the main results of the convergence models.
Main results
In the following section we compare the estimation results of different convergence models for each Maastricht criterion.
Inflation rates
The estimates for the 2-regime spline regression that includes all the 12 members are The estimates for the 11 countries show a lower pace of convergence (1.7 basis points compared to 2.9 per month) in the first regime. Again, we see a divergence of 1 basis point for the second regime, which is considerably higher than for the first regime. 
EMU countries
The estimates are rejecting the convergence hypothesis for the last regime and the 1.6 basis points divergence is significant. Moreover, note the divergence for the years 1998 and 1999. Indeed, the slope coefficient is significantly different from 0 (α = 10%) and the F-test is significant as well (p-value < .0001).
Concerning the third hypothesis about the number of regimes, we see a clear preference for the 3-regime model. (The AIC value for the 3-regime model is -5.884 while the AIC value for the 2-regime model is -4.660). The likelihood ratio test between the 2 models is highly significant, too. This means that the whole convergence process happened in the Maastricht regime while the stabilisation process for the Amsterdam and the Euroland regime is quite different.
For the 4 th hypothesis about the smooth transition we find almost identical AIC and loglikelihood values for both models. Therefore we will prefer the smooth transition model according to the principle of parsimony (i.e. the smallest number of parameters).
Conclusion 1: The convergence for the inflation rate in the EMU countries happened statistically significant during the Maastricht regime. For the 2 nd regime and the 3 rd regime we find a flat regression line (i.e. a levelling off) and the smooth transition model is supported by the data. From January '00 to September '01 we detect a small but non-significant divergence between the inflation rates.
Long-term interest rates
The 2-regime spline model for the 12 EMU members is estimated as: (2) and (5)). We find an impressive convergence process for the inflation rates during the Maastricht regime (see last section) that was matched by a similar process for the interest rate differentials.
Note that the stabilisation process for the Amsterdam and the Euroland regime is quite similar. While the slope of the 2 nd regime was slightly negative, it became positive in the 3 rd regime, although both slopes are non-significant. Concerning hypothesis 4 about the smooth transition, we find again almost identical AIC and log-likelihood values for both models. (The AIC value is 2.892). Thus, we prefer the smooth transition model for the interest rates convergence.
Conclusion 2: The convergence for long-term interest rates in the EMU for the first two regimes was similar to the convergence process of the inflation rates and has levelled off in the last two regimes from January '98 to September '01. The smooth transition model is preferred by the data, and a slight divergence effect in mean and variances can be seen for the last regime.
Annual public deficit to GDP
The analysis for the annual public deficit is based on annual data. This implies shorter time series and the estimation of a 2-regime model, i.e. we will mainly learn about the convergence process before and after 1997. Because of pooling the data, we have enough d.f. to estimate a 2-regime model, but these yearly estimates are less reliable and interpretable than quarterly results. The spline estimates are We see that the EMU countries reduced their annual deficits with an annual rate of 0.3%-points (p-value = 0.0303). In the second regime the trend was even more evident (-1.2% per year with a p-value of 1.3%). The estimated regression line crosses the 3% target line in 1997. The slope in the first regime is flatter than before and is only significant at a 10% level.
This means that the hypothesis for non-convergence during the Maastricht regime cannot be rejected. The estimated regression line again crosses the 3% line in 1997. In the second regime the negative trend is significant, irrespective of Greece being included or not. This means that the EMU countries started seriously reducing their annual deficit only in the last regimes since 1997. The F-value is highly significant at a .001% level. Note that the general trend has changed for most countries in the last regime, since all countries were still below the 3% line for their projected annual deficit in 2001.
Conclusion 3: On average the EMU members have decreased their annual public deficit (ratio to GDP) over the whole period since 1992. Before 1997, in the Maastricht regime, the reduction of the deficit was not statistically significant and in addition, no convergence in the variances can be seen. Since 1997 the time trend in the means is significant and the variance is smaller than in the Maastricht regime. respectively. This is a sign for a small improvement of the debt ratio, but the evidence for a rigorous debt convergence remains weak since all countries are required to have a debt ratio lower than 60%. 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001p >60% of overall public debt to GDP Figure 10 : Number of countries with overall debt ratio above 60%
Overall public debt ratio to GDP
Is there convergence in the 2 nd moments?
We are interested if in addition to the convergence process in the mean equation ( 1 st moments) we can find a convergence process in the variance equations.
As expected from the scatterplots, also the residual variances of the convergence models are decreasing functions of time. This is seen from the following estimations of the spline or the separate piecewise regression model with heteroskedastic errors (the appendix discusses the specification of these models). The log-likelihood is 4214.45 (AIC = -6.96) and is much higher than the model without Also we have made a simple analysis concerning the break points of our 2 or 3-regime model with and without heteroskedastic errors. As it turns out, there is no big difference between the log-likelihood values or the AIC values if the breakpoint is allowed to change over a period of +-3 months from the endpoints of the regimes. We conclude that the choice of the break points does not alter our results. 
Conclusions
The paper analysed the convergence process of the 4 Maastricht variables over the last 12 years and found 3 rather different regimes since the EMU was established in 1992.
While the interest rates and the inflation rates converged until 1997, the annual deficit and the public debt started declining after 1997. The variance between the EMU countries, a measure for heterogeneity, also decreased parallel to the level processes.
Our findings can be summarized as follows:
1) The target-oriented convergence for the inflation rate of the EMU countries all happened in the Maastricht regime. During the 2 nd regime and 3 rd regime the time series stay within the bounds of the target path. The convergence processes have remained on a constant level but the variance of the path has slightly increased in the last regime. Over the whole period the spline model is supported; in the 3 rd regime from January '00 to September '01 there is a small tendency for divergence.
2) The convergence for long-term interest rates in the EMU was impressively strong for the first regime and stabilized around the target path for the next two regimes. Interestingly, we find a statistical significant divergence for the last regime from Jan. 2000 to Sept. 2001, but the amount is rather small at the moment.
3) During the first (Maastricht) regime the budget discipline in terms of the annual deficit was rather weak, which can be seen from the non-significant but negative trend. This shows that the EMU countries failed to achieve a targeted convergence during the Maastricht regime. Over the second and third regime since 1999, on average, the EMU members have decreased their annual public deficit to GDP dramatically, but the trend has not yet levelled off. The convergence process of the annual deficit is different with respect to two points. First it is characterized only by a convergence of the mean process in the 2 nd and 3 rd regime, while convergence in the second moments has taken place (over the whole period).
4) The behavior of the debt ratios among the EMU countries is rather heterogeneous. A majority of 8 EMU countries exhibit a clear decreasing debt-ratio for the last two regimes. This trend is shared with the remaining EMU countries for the last two regimes but on different levels. While Luxembourg had always been below the 60% target line, 3 countries of the EMU are still not meeting this threshold. Moreover, we observe a targeted positive but not significant trend for the debt-ratio over the first regime. The variance of the target path has decreased over the first regime but not over the 2 nd and 3 rd regime 5) In general, the spline model is supported by the convergence process that indicates a "soft landing" of the convergence process at the target levels for inflation and interest rates. The model estimates do not show a soft landing for the government debt and deficit variables. Compared to the 2-regime model, the 3-regime regression model gives a better fit and the likelihood ratio test between the models is significant. Overall we see that the convergence process follows the economic expectations: Interest rates are following a more tighter convergence path than inflation rates, because of the market pressures of a common currency and because both are under control of monetary authorities, while deficit variables are by nature more volatile and their convergence paths have more freedom to deviate from a target.
